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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Appellants, Horton Hodsen and Gail Anderson, appeal from an order of Fifth

1

Judicial District Court Judge James L. Shumate, granting Defendant/Appellee's motion
for summary judgment and dismissing Plaintiff/Appellant's third amended complaint for
declaratory relief. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to a transfer of
jurisdiction by the Utah Supreme Court, as provided in Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)
(1998).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Horton Hodsen is a graduate of a medical school but is not licensed to practice
medicine in the State of Utah. He desires to diagnose medical conditions of individuals,
prescribe the use of herbs and other products of nature he believes they need, and use a
business card which identifies him with the title MM.D.,f Because Hodsen is not licensed
as a physician, these acts are prohibited by the Utah Medical Practices Act. Does this
prohibition by the Utah Medical Practices Act violate Hodsen's constitutional rights to
freedom of speech and the free exercise of religion?
Standard of review: A trial court's interpretation of constitutional provisions and
statutes is a conclusion of law, reviewed for correctness. United Park City Mines
Company v. Greater Park Citv Co.. 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993). The trial court's
grant of summary judgment is a conclusion of law reviewed for correctness. Higgins v.
Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993).

2

DETERMINATIVE LAW
The Utah Medical Practices Act ("UMPA"), Utah Code Ann. § 58-67-101 (1998)
et. seq., defines "medical practice" as follows:
"Practice of Medicine" means:
(a) to diagnose, treat, correct, or prescribe for any human disease,
ailment, injury, infirmity, deformity, pain or other condition, physical or
mental, real or imaginary, or to attempt to do so, by any means or
instrumentality, and by an individual in Utah or outside the state upon or for
any human within the state;
(d) to use, in the conduct of any occupation or profession pertaining
to the diagnosis or treatment of human diseases or conditions in any printed
material, stationery, letterhead, envelopes, signs, or advertisements, the
designation "doctor", "doctor of medicine", "physician", "surgeon",
"physician and surgeon", "Dr.," "M.D.," or any combination of these
designations in any manner which might cause a reasonable person to
believe the individual using the designation is a licensed physician and
surgeon, and if the party using the designation is not a licensed physician
and surgeon, the designation must additionally contain the description of
the branch of the healing arts for which the person has a license.
U.C.A. § 58-67-102(8) (1998). The UMPA defines "diagnose" as follows:
(4) "Diagnose" means:
(a) to examine in any manner another person, parts of a person's
body, substances; fluids, or materials excreted, taken, or removed
from a person's body, or produced by a person's body, to determine
the source, nature, kind, or extent of a disease or other physical or
mental condition.
(b) to attempt to conduct an examination or determination
described under Subsection (4)(a);
(c) to hold oneself out as making or to represent that one is
making an examination or determination as described in Subsection
(4)(a); or
(d) to make an examination or determination as described in
Subsection (4)(a) upon or from information supplied directly or
3

indirectly by another person making or attempting the diagnosis or
examination.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-67-102 (1998).
The UMPA exempts the following from the requirement of licensure:
(2) an individual administering a domestic or family remedy;
(3)(a)(i) a person engaged in the sale of vitamins, health foods,
dietary supplements, herbs, or other products of nature, the
sale of which is not otherwise prohibited by the state of
federal law; and
(ii) a person acting in good faith for religious reasons, as a
matter of conscience, or based on a personal belief, when
obtaining or providing any information regarding health care
and the use of any product under Subsection (3)(a)(i); and
(b) Subsection (3)(a) does not:
(i) allow a person to diagnose any human disease, ailment,
injury, infirmity, deformity, pain, or other condition; or
(ii) prohibit providing truthful and non-misleading
information regarding any of the products under Subsection
(3)(a)(i);
(4) a person engaged in good faith in the practice of religious tenets
of any church or religious belief, without the use of prescription
drugs;
Utah Code Ann. § 58-67-305 (1998).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 6, 1996, Hodsen filed a complaint challenging the application of
certain 1996 amendments to the Utah Medical Practices Act. Hodsen sought declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief (Record p.3 [hereafter R.]) A third amended complaint
was filed July 8, 1996. (R.47) DOPL's answer was filed January 6, 1998. (R. 251) The

parties filed a stipulation of facts on May 6, 1998 (R.272), and Anderson filed an affidavit
May 12, 1998. (R.329) Hodsen and Anderson filed a motion for partial summary
judgment on May 6, 1998. (R. 285) DOPL filed a motion for summary judgment on
May 12, 1998. (R.333) On June 30, 1998, following a hearing, the trial court denied
Hodsen and Anderson's motion for partial summary judgment and granted DOPL's
motion for summary judgment, finding that the UMPA did not deprive Hodsen or
Anderson of their constitutionally protected rights to free speech and free exercise of
religion. (R.373) Hodsen and Anderson filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment on
July 14, 1998. (R.375) The motion was denied July 30, 1998. (R.404) A Notice of
Appeal was filed August 27, 1998. (R.418).

STATEMENT OF FACTS1
The Appellant ("Hodsen") is a graduate of the University of California Los
Angeles School of Medicine and has a degree in biochemistry from University of
California Berkeley. (R.273). He is not licensed as a physician, surgeon, or dietician in
the State of Utah. (R.273).
Hodsen operates a business distributing herbal and other non-prescription

1

These facts are uncontested, having been stipulated to by all parties in the lower
proceedings. All of these facts are set forth in the stipulated facts, attached as Addendum
1. Appellee objects to Hodsen's statement of facts because it mixes stipulated facts with
argument.
5

products. (R.273).
Appellant Anderson consulted with Hodsen for a health condition from which she
suffered. (R.274).
Hodsen's business practice with Anderson and other potential customers begins
when the person approaches Hodsen and provides him information regarding the person's
medical ailment or conditions. (R.282). The information may have originated from a
health care provider; it may have been gathered by the person through home medical
testing or home study of medical literature; it may have come to the customer from
intuitive or spiritual impressions or blessings; or the customer may simply tell Hodsen,
either orally or in a written history, his or her symptoms of health conditions. (R.283).
Using this information, Hodsen identifies what he believes the needs of the person are
and which herbal or other products would satisfy those needs. He then identifies the
herbs or other products for the person and offers them for sale. (R.283).
Hodsen believes that he has a divine mission to assist people in obtaining and
properly using herbal and other products of nature. (R.274). Hodsen admits that his
receipt and review of information from people and his determinations and
recommendations do not, in and of themselves, constitute religious practices or belief.
(R.274).
Hodsen uses prayer to guide his interpretation of scientific data and information
provided by the customer for the purpose of making recommendations. (R.274). He
6

believes that he receives divine assistance regarding these matters. (R.274).
It is uncontested in this appeal that the conduct of Hodsen constitutes diagnosis,
and therefore the practice of medicine, pursuant to U.C.A. § 58-67- 102(4)(d). (R.284)
Hodsen did not appeal a 1995 Fifth Judicial District Court order finding that his practices
constitute "diagnosis" and therefore the practice of medicine (R.276), and Hodsen does
not take issue with this finding in this appeal. (See Appellant's Statement of Issues,
Appellant's brief p. 1-2).
Although Hodsen is not licensed to practice medicine, he wishes to use the
designations "M.D." on commercial or personal literature, or other communications.
(R.280-281). He states he will qualify the designations with an asterisk indicating
"Graduate of U.C.L.A. School of Medicine Research biochemist not in medical practice."
(R.280-281).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The practice of medicine is a privilege, subject to the police powers of the state to
protect and preserve the public health. The state of Utah has a compelling interest in
regulating the medical profession, and it has broad powers to establish standards for
licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of medicine. State regulatory statutes
should be upheld provided the classifications they establish have a reasonable basis.
The regulation of the practice of a profession is a valid exercise of state police
7

power and is not subject to First Amendment scrutiny. Hodsen fails to include a separate
state constitutional analysis, and therefore a state constitutional claim is not properly
before the Court. The Utah Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the UMPA
in three opinions, two of which involved First Amendment challenges indistinguishable
from the one at bar. A "rational basis" test is used in examining the constitutionality of
statutes regulating professions, including state limitations on the use of professional
designations such as "Dr." and "M.D." by unlicensed individuals. Cases analyzing
limitations on advertising by licensed professionals are inapposite.
The UMPA does not violate Hodsen's or Anderson's right to free exercise of
religion. The UMPA expressly exempts the practice of religious tenets from its purview.

ARGUMENT
POINT I: UTAH HAS A COMPELLING INTEREST IN REGULATING THE
PRACTICE OF MEDICINE AND IT HAS BROAD POWER TO REGULATE THOSE
WHO DIAGNOSE AND TREAT HUMAN AILMENTS AND CONDITIONS.

There exists no vested right to practice medicine. The practice of medicine is a
privilege, or conditional right, subject to the police powers of the state to protect and
preserve the public health.2 In Watson v. Maryland. 218 U.S. 173 (1910), the United
2

Lambert v. Yellowslev. 272 U.S. 581, 596, 47 S.Ct. 210, 214, 72 L.Ed. 422
(1926). Likewise, the Utah Supreme Court stated, "The public interest requiring the
regulation of healing arts and the Legislature undertaking such regulation, it necessarily
follows that the profession of healing is no longer a right... but should properly be
8

States Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of a Maryland man convicted of practicing
medicine without a license. The Court noted that it is well settled that the state police
power extends to the regulation of professions carried out within the state, and that
,f

[t]here is perhaps no profession more properly open to such regulation than that which

embraces the practitioners of medicine." Id. at 176. The practice of medicine is
"obviously one of those vocations where the power of the state may be exerted to see that
only properly qualified persons shall undertake its responsible and difficult duties." I d
The Court held that professional classifications, exemptions, and exceptions created by
the regulatory scheme will be upheld as long as they have a "reasonable basis," not
merely arbitrary selection between the subjects included and those excluded by the law.
Id. at 178. Only where the professional regulatory statute "unnecessarily and arbitrarily"
interferes with property and personal rights of citizens does it exceed the police powers of
the state. Id.

The necessity of such regulatory statutes, and the nature and the extent of

the qualifications required, depend upon the judgment of each state. Dent v. West
Virginia. 129 U.S. 114 (1889). "The legislature, then, in the interest of society, and to
prevent the imposition of quacks, adventurers, and charlatans upon the ignorant and
credulous, has the power to prescribe the qualifications of those whom the State permits
to practice medicine." Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 195 (1898).3 Time and time

labeled a privilege...." State v. Hoffman ("Hoffman I"). 558 P.2d 602 (Utah 1976).
3

The United State Supreme Court has more recently reaffirmed that states have a
"compelling interest" in regulating professions within their boundaries, and that they have
9

again, the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of state statutes regulating
the practice of medicine as valid exercises of police power.4
Likewise, the Utah Supreme Court long ago recognized Utah's compelling interest
in regulating the medical profession through its police powers. In Board of Medical
Examiners v. Blair, 196 P. 221 (Utah 1921), the court, noting that the State has a keen
interest in the health of the community, held that the legislature, in the exercise of its

"broad power" to establish standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the practice
of professions. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975).
4

Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889) (the United States Supreme Court
restated the deferential analysis applied to professional regulatory schemes, holding that
only when such statutes "have no relation to such calling or profession, or are
unattainable by such reasonable study and application" can they be said to operate to
deprive one of his right to pursue a lawful vocation, in upholding the conviction of a
practicing physician with several years experience who had not met license requirements
established after he commenced the practice of medicine because he had not graduated
from a school recognized by the Board of Health); Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505
(1903) (upholding a statute creating a board entrusted to pass on the qualifications
necessary to practice medicine); Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173 (1910) (upholding
exemptions and exceptions in a state statute generally requiring licensure to practice
medicine.); Collins v. Texas, 223 U.S. 288 (1912) (upholding a statute regulating the
practice of osteopathy attacked as unconstitutional because the licensing act established
standards unnecessary for the practice of osteopathy); Crane v. Johnson, 242 U.S. 339
(1917) (upholding a statute requiring drugless practitioners to be licensed, including those
whose practice includes prayer and faith together with special skill, experience, and
ability, while exempting from licensure requirement those whose practice consists solely
of prayer and faith); Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165 (1923) (upholding a state's
delegation of power to determine fitness to practice dentistry to a board of examiners);
Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 425 (1926) (sustaining the conviction of practicing
dentistry without a license against a person who, although a dental graduate, was declined
for licensure because he had not graduated from an accredited dental school, as
determined by a board of examiners.).
10

police power for the protection of its citizens, may determine and prescribe the
qualifications necessary to practice medicine. Echoing the deferential standard applied by
the United States Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court said, "[s]o long as any
regulation is enacted and enforced with the object of protecting the health of the
community, such legislation and regulation should not be nullified by the courts unless it
clearly appears to violate some fundamental right of the individual/' Id at 223.
(Emphasis added.)
The State of Utah not only has a compelling State interest in regulating the practice
of medicine within its borders, "but a failure to do so could be a direct derogation of the
implied powers of the State to promote the health, safety, comfort, morals, and welfare of
the people." State v. Hoffman. 558 P.2d 602 (Utah 1976).
Despite the overwhelming authority to the contrary, Hodsen asserts that the State
of Utah does not have a compelling interest in regulating the practice of medicine.
Appellant's Br. at 31. He cites a strict scrutiny first amendment holding from the United
States Supreme Court (not a professional licensing case) for the proposition that ,fa law
cannot be regarded as protecting an interest of the highest order when it leaves
appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited,"5 in arguing that the
legislature has left the practice of medicine open to other potential abuse, and therefore it
must not be a compelling state interest. Hodsen's reliance on factually inapposite strict
5

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Ave v. Citv of Hialeah. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
11

scrutiny caselaw is misplaced. Courts have uniformly refused to apply First Amendment
scrutiny (strict, intermediate, or otherwise) to the regulation of occupations and
professions unless and until the regulation crosses the line into regulation of speech per
se. See Point II, below. Rather, both the United States Supreme Court and the Utah
Supreme Court have applied a deferential analysis to statutory schemes regulating the
practice of medicine.

POINT II: THE HOFFMAN DECISIONS UPHOLDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE UMPA ARE DIRECTLY CONTROLLING IN THIS CASE. THE UTAH
MEDICAL PRACTICES ACT'S REGULATION OF THOSE WHO MAY PROVIDE
PERSONALIZED CARE THROUGH DIAGNOSIS TO A PARTICULAR CUSTOMER
IS NOT SUBJECT TO FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY.
A. Hodsen provides no meaningful State Constitutional analysis differentiating
State from Federal Constitutional Protections.
Although Hodsen nominally refers to Article 1 Section 4 and Article 3 Section 1 of
the Utah Constitution, he offers merely conclusory statements without separate analysis
of those provisions. He notes that Utah has two constitutional provisions he feels were
violated, making the unsupported conclusion that the language in the Utah Constitution
"indicates a desire to guarantee a higher level of protection to religious thought and belief
than that found or stated elsewhere." Appellant's brief p. 20. However, he "does not
argue that the analysis of the issue under the Utah Constitution would be different from
the analysis under the federal constitution." State v. Mace. 921 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Utah

12

1996) (quoting State v. Lafferty. 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 & n.5 (Utah 1988), habeas corpus
granted on other grounds, Laffertv v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991), cert, denied,
504 U.S. 911 (1992)). For example, he cites no authority establishing different standards
of review, provides no specific analysis of the difference in wording between the state
and federal constitutional provisions, and does not attempt to distinguish federal or state
case law based upon differences in wording. In the absence of specific state
constitutional analysis, no state constitutional claim is properly before the Court. Id.

B. The Utah Supreme Court's Hoffman decisions upholding the
constitutionality of the UMPA against First Amendment Challenges are directly
controlling.
The Utah Supreme Court has affirmed the constitutionality of Utah's Medical
Practices Act in two cases involving First Amendment challenges. Both cases involved
the unlicensed activities of Wendell H. Hoffman.
In the first case, State v. Hoffman. 558 P.2d 602 (Ut. 1976) ("Hoffman I").
Hoffman appealed his conviction of two counts of practicing medicine without a license,
arguing that the Utah Medical Practices Act violated his constitutional right of conscience
or abridged his free exercise of religion. In rejecting Hoffman's argument and affirming
the police powers of the state to regulate the practice of medicine, the Utah Supreme
Court stated:
The Legislature is protecting the people from the quacks who would
13

deceive them into thinking they are receiving medical relief when, in
reality, they are being deprived of their money without the remotest
possibility of cure. This type of quackery also prevents people who may be
or are in dire need of competent aid by their either delaying or foregoing
proper treatment. These ill people think they are being cured, when, in fact,
they are receiving no real help. There is no evidence the appellant is a
member of any valid religious organization or that he has valid religious
beliefs to do what he did.
Hoffman I at 605-606.
Hodsen's attempt to distinguish Hoffman I is not persuasive. Hodsen argues that
Hoffman was not practicing his religious beliefs and that Hodsen was. If Hodsen had
demonstrated that this activity constituted a good faith religious tenet, it might fall within
the UMPA exemption from licensure for the practice of religious tenets. However, he has
stipulated that this activity itself did not constitute the practice of a religious tenet.
Hodsen was diagnosing individuals medical conditions, not as the practice of any
religious tenet of any church or religious belief, and thus practicing medicine without a
license.

Hodsen next argues, in essence, that Hoffman was a quack but that he is not.6

However, DOPL, as a regulating authority, has no barometer with which to discern which
unlicensed practitioners are quacks and which are not. This is precisely why the
legislature has required licensure of the healing arts. The combined education and testing
requirements of the UMPA are intended to assure a level of proficiency and competency
6

In so arguing, Hodsen misquotes the stipulated fact regarding the scientific
publications and studies supporting the use of herbs. The State agreed that such studies
indicate the use of herbs and other natural remedies "may" have a positive impact on
one's health.
14

in the practice of medicine. The UMPA provides no distinction between unlicensed
practice utilizing "quacky" treatments and unlicensed practices in which the treatments
employed are supported by scientific studies. Nor is there authority recognizing such
distinction. Unlicensed practice of medicine is unlicensed practice of medicine regardless
of the treatments employed.
Hodsen further attempts to distinguish Hoffman I by arguing that he has been
practicing for a long time and has a lot of education and training. Neither the Hoffman
opinion nor the UMPA provide any support for the notion that any degree of education or
training justify the unlicensed practice of medicine. Hodsen argues that his unlicensed
practice has been helpful to Anderson and that she has suffered since he has stopped. The
unlicensed practice of medicine is unlawful regardless of whether a customer feels it was
helpful to her. The unlicensed practice of medicine cannot be justified by the end results.
Finally, Hodsen argues that Anderson desires the unlicensed treatment she has received
from Hodsen. Again, the desires of Anderson are irrelevant to the analysis.
In the second case, State v. Hoffman, ("Hoffman ID 733 P.2d 502 (Ut. 1987), the
Utah Supreme Court again upheld the constitutionality of the Utah Medical Practices Act
against First and Fourteenth Amendment challenges, holding,

The right to practice medicine, to diagnose maladies, and to prescribe for
their treatment is not constitutionally superior to the state's power to impose
comprehensive and rigid regulations on the practice. Defendant has not
shown and cannot show that a criminal violation of the Act by the
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unlicensed prescription of treatments and cures to the gullible and unwary
public for compensation rises to the level of a constitutionally protected
activity.
Id. at 505 (Emphasis added). Thus, the unlicensed diagnosis of ailments and prescription
of treatments and cures, or in other words, the unlicensed practice of medicine, is not
constitutionally protected activity.
Hodsen's attempts to distinguish Hoffman II are equally unpersuasive. Hodsen
argues Hoffman did not adequately brief the constitutional issues, but that Hodsen has.
While it appears true that Hoffman did not cite authority in support of his First
Amendment argument, it is a matter of speculation whether Hoffman could have found
any authority in support of his argument on that point, and whether such authority would
in any event have outweighed the large body of law to the contrary and created a different
result in the case. Indeed, if that authority were available to Hoffman it would have been
available to Hodsen who also fails to cite it. Hodsen next argues the information used to
diagnose Anderson's condition was truthful and non-misleading, that she has benefitted
from the same, and that Hodsen has training and experience. Again, as in his attempt to
use these factors to distinguish Hoffman I, none of these factors are relevant to the
analysis. Next, Hodsen argues that the products he prescribes are not really prescriptions
after all, because they are lawfully sold without a prescription. However, Hoffman did not
utilize prescription drugs in the treatment he rendered, either. Furthermore, the United
States Supreme Court has upheld that states may constitutionally require "drugless"
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healers to be licensed to practice medicine, provided their treatment went beyond merely
faith, prayer, and the practice of actual religious tenets. Crane v. Johnson. 242 U.S. 339
(1917). Hodsen argues that the legislature's removal of the word "advise'1 in 1996
affected the continuing vitality of the Hoffman decision. However, the conduct of
Hoffman, like the conduct of Hodsen, went well beyond providing advice. It included the
actual diagnosis of and prescription of treatment for specific human ailments and medical
conditions for monetary consideration. Hodsen simply cannot distinguish the rulings in
Hoffman I and Hoffman II from the case at bar.

C. First Amendment scrutiny is not appropriate in examining state statutes
regulating who may provide specific personalized diagnosis.
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Hoffman II, that the "defendant... cannot
show that a criminal violation of the Act by the unlicensed prescription of treatments and
cures to the . . . public for compensation rises to the level of a constitutionally protected
activity," Hoffman II at 505, is in accord with recent decisions from neighboring
jurisdictions holding that First Amendment scrutiny is not appropriate in examining a
state's regulation of a profession. The regulation of the medical profession, provided the
state does not cross the line into the regulation of speech per se, is simply not a First
Amendment issue.
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The Nebraska Supreme Court7, the Colorado Supreme Court8, and the Illinois Court
of Appeals9 have upheld the constitutionality of their states' medical practices acts against
First Amendment challenges, adopting United States Supreme Court Justice Byron
White's detailed First Amendment analysis of the interrelationship between the regulation
of professions and the guarantee of freedom of speech in his concurring opinion in Lowe
v. S.E.C..472U.S. 181(1985).
In Lowe, the United States Supreme Court considered a First Amendment challenge
to the Investment Advisors Act, which regulates the profession of securities and
investment advisors. Justice White, concurring with the majority10, noted that the case
presented the conflict between the power of government to license and regulate those who

7

Department of Health v. Hinze. 441 N.W.2d 593 (Neb. 1989). An examination
of this case follows at p.21 of Appellee's brief.
8

People v. Jeffers, 690 P.2d 194 (Colo. 1984). An examination of this case
follows at P.23 of Appellee's brief.
9

People v. Rav. 119 IU.App.3d 180, 456 N.E.2d 179 (111. 1983). See p.24 of
Appellee's brief.
10

The majority opinion disposed of the case on statutory grounds, and therefore
did not reach the First Amendment issues. Justice White, joined by Justices Burger and
Rehnquist, concurred with the result, but analyzed in depth the First Amendment issues.
DOPL recognizes that a concurring opinion is not binding precedent upon this
Court. However, Justice White's concurrence is the first and only detailed analysis by the
High Court regarding the First Amendment implications of a statute regulating a
profession, and it is presented as detailed, thoughtful, and persuasive argument. DOPL
urges this courts adoption of the analysis, as other courts have done. See notes 8, 9, and
10.
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engage in a profession and the rights of freedom of speech guaranteed by the First
Amendment. Id at 228. He reviewed prior precedent giving states broad power to
regulate the practice of occupations and professions, including "speaking professions,"
those professions which utilize speech in verbal or written form extensively in the conduct
of the profession. He reaffirmed the "rational basis" test, finding that regulations on entry
into a profession are generally constitutional if they "have a rational connection with the
applicant's fitness or capacity to practice" the profession. Id at 228-229. Justice White
stated:
The power of government to regulate the professions is not lost whenever
the practice of a profession entails speech. The underlying principle was
expressed by the Court in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S.
490, 502, 69 S.Ct. 684, 690-691, 93 L.Ed. 834 (1949): "it has never been
deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of
conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced,
or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed."
Id at 228-229.
Justice White pointed to the practice of law as an example of a "speaking
profession." Although a lawyer's work is almost entirely devoted to the sort of
communicative acts that, viewed in isolation, fall within the First Amendment's
protection, "courts have never doubted that a State can require high standards of
qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an
applicant to the bar

" Id.

Justice White observed that, although a State clearly has the right to license
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occupations and professions, including "speaking professions," "[a]t some point, a
measure is no longer a regulation of a profession but a regulation of speech or of the
press; beyond that point, the statute must survive the level of scrutiny demanded by the
First Amendment.11 Id. at 230. Thus, valid exercises of regulatory control over a
profession by a state pursuant to its police powers are not subject to First Amendment
analysis because the professional's speech is incidental to the conduct of the profession.
It is the conduct of the profession rather than the speech itself which is being regulated.
First Amendment scrutiny begins only when a state goes beyond regulating a
profession and into regulating speech per se. Justice White found that the line between
regulation of a profession and regulation of speech is drawn between personalized advice
to a client and general, non-personalized speech on a subject:
One who takes the affairs of a client personally in hand and purports
to exercise judgment on behalf of the client in the light of the client's
individual needs and circumstances is properly viewed as engaging in the
practice of a profession.. .. If the government enacts generally applicable
licensing provisions limiting the class of persons who may practice the
profession, it cannot be said to have enacted a limitation on freedom of
speech or the press subject to First Amendment scrutiny. Where the
personal nexus between professional and client does not exist, and a speaker
does not purport to be exercising judgment on behalf of any particular
individual with whose circumstances he is directly acquainted, government
regulation ceases to function as legitimate regulation of professional
practice with only incidental impact on speech....
I d at 232.
The Utah Medical Practices Act respects, in all instances, the line established in
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Lowe. The Act expressly protects Hodsen and Anderson's right to generalized speech
without requiring licensure. It merely prohibits Hodsen from "taking the affairs of a
client personally in hand" and making a diagnosis of the client's personal medical
conditions, without being licensed to practice medicine. Because the act is a "generally
applicable licensing provision limiting the class of persons who may practice medicine"
in Utah, the state "cannot be said to have enacted a limitation on freedom of speech or of
the press subject to First Amendment scrutiny." Id. at 232.
The Nebraska Supreme Court adopted Justice White's concurring opinion in
Lowe, in Department of Health v. Hinze, 441 N.W.2d 593 (Neb. 1989), a case
indistinguishable from the one at bar. In Hmze, the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the
Nebraska Medical Practices Act, finding that the act did not violate the First Amendment
rights of Hinze. Citing and adopting Justice White's opinion in Lowe, the court refused
to apply First Amendment scrutiny to the state's regulation of the practice of medicine.
In Hinze the facts were as follows: Hinze, who held a Bachelor's degree in
naturopathy and a Ph.D. in Pharmacy, was permanently enjoined from engaging in the
practice of medicine without a license, which included an injunction from attaching to his
name any word or abbreviation indicating that he was engaged in the treatment or
diagnosis of ailments, diseases, injuries, pain, deformity, infirmity, or any physical or
mental condition of human beings. Sometime subsequent to this injunction, Hinze
conducted a seminar, charging attendees $45.00 apiece. Hinze, introduced to the
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audience as MDr. John HinzeM without informing them he was a Ph.D., not a medical
doctor, informed the gathering he would be providing information regarding homeopathic
or naturopathic treatments. After speaking generally about homeopathic and naturopathic
remedies, Hinze opened the discussion up to the audience. Several audience members
described ailments or conditions they or family members had, and Hinze prescribed
various non-prescription naturopathic type remedies, including what he felt to be
appropriate dosages.1! Also present at the seminar was Hinze's business partner, Les
McGerr, who was taking orders for the "naturopathic remedies" Hinze prescribed to
audience members. Id, at 594-596.
The Department of Health initiated criminal contempt of court proceedings against

11

One woman told Hinze that her son had been run over by an automobile and was
having seizures. Hinze prescribed arnica in doses of 30X to 200X, and that salica should
be applied to the scars the child received.
Another woman asked Hinze about dark circles under her children's eyes. Hinze
explained that the circles were associated with poor digestion and allergies and he
prescribed fennel, anise, mints, and gentian.
A third woman said she knew her children were infested with pinworms. Hinze
prescribed carrots, pumpkin seed, and gentian.
Another audience member told Hinze that her husband suffered from high
cholesterol and high blood pressure. Hinze prescribed dandelion root to stimulate the
man's liver.
An undercover investigator for the Nebraska Department of Health posing as an
audience member told Hinze that he was having kidney problems and was taking
medication called Bactrim. Hinze told the investigator to drink water and cranberry juice
sweetened with sugar. Hinze explained to the investigator that Bactrim was
"crystalizing" in his kidneys. Hinze suggested he use com silk and uva-ursi to treat the
kidney problems.
Id. at 595.
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Hinze for violating the injunction. The Nebraska trial court found Hinze in criminal
contempt of court. Hinze appealed, claiming that the criminal contempt findings violated
his right to freedom of speech. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the criminal
contempt findings in total, including the violation of the prohibition against identifying
himself as "Dr."

Citing Justice White's concurring opinion in Lowe, the Court found

that it was not appropriate to apply First Amendment scrutiny to the state regulation of
the medical profession. The court held that any infringement on Hinze's freedom of
speech created by this injunction was, at most, incidental, and was outweighed by this
State's compelling interest in protecting the health and welfare of the citizens of
Nebraska. Id at 598.
Likewise, the Colorado Supreme Court has held that regulation of professions is
not subject to First Amendment scrutiny and that any infringement of the freedom of
speech that might result from such regulation is incidental to the compelling state interest
of regulating professions for the welfare of its people. In People v. Jeffers, 690 P.2d 194
(Colo. 1984), cited approvingly in Hoffman IL12 the Defendant appealed an order
convicting him of practicing medicine without a license, claiming that prohibiting him
from practicing medicine without a license "chilled" forms of speech protected by the
U.S. Constitution. In holding that the regulation of the practice of medicine is an
appropriate exercise of police power, the Colorado Supreme Court reasoned that, "the
12

733 P.2d 502, 505.
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practice of medicine itself is not protected by the First Amendment. Therefore,
reasonable regulation of medical practice does not conflict with First Amendment
protections." Id. at 198.13 Accord People v. Rav. 119 Ill.App.3d 180, 456 N.E.2d 179
(111. App. 1983), also holding that any infringement on the appellant's freedom of speech
caused by requiring him to be licensed to practice medicine before diagnosing individuals
was incidental and outweighed by the state's compelling interest in the regulation of
medicine.
Hodsen repeatedly claims that the UMPA creates a "total ban on the speech of
Hodsen and Anderson." It does not. The UMPA simply forbids Hodsen from
"diagnosing, treating, correcting, or prescribing for" Anderson's or any individual's
specific medical ailments or conditions. It does not forbid them from discussing the
healing qualities of herbs in general, or scriptural references to the healing qualities of
herbs, or discussions of the interrelationship between God, man, and the role of lawful
products of nature in the plan of salvation, provided no specific diagnosis is made. It
does not forbid Hodsen from making commentary in public or private regarding the

13

Hodsen attempts to distinguish Jeffers by quoting the court as recognizing that
the statute in question "has no discemable effect on speech or expression." However, the
Court makes this conclusion because "reasonable regulation of medical practice does not
conflict with First Amendment protections." 690 P.2d at 198. Thus, Jeffers is in full
accord with Lowe, and is not distinguishable from Lowe, Hoffman II, or Hinze. Hodsen
further attempts to distinguish the case because the statute in question is criminal.
However, the existence of criminal sanctions would certainly not diminish the scrutiny of
the court.
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healing qualities of herbs in general, and advocating the use of such remedies, provided
no specific diagnosis is made.
Hodsen claims the UMPA, as applied to him and Anderson, is overbroad. His
overbreadth analysis consists entirely of an attempt to distinguish Hoffman IL which
squarely held the Act was not overly broad. Contrary to Hodsen's assertion that the
overbreadth argument was rejected due to Hoffman's lack of standing, the Utah Supreme
Court addressed the substance of the claim, finding that the statute was not overly broad.
Hoffman II at 505. Hoffman II is directly dispositive of the issue.
An overbroad law is one "shown to prohibit constitutionally protected behavior as
well as unprotected behavior." Id In order for Hodsen to prevail in his argument, he
would have to show that his actions in diagnosing medical conditions of others is
constitutionally protected behavior. Regarding the use of ffM.D.,M he would likewise have
to show that the use of a professional designation by an unlicensed individual is
constitutionally protected behavior. As cited in this Section, courts of this and other
jurisdictions have authoritatively rejected such claims.

D. The provisions of the UMPA limiting the use of professional
designations such as "Dr.,f or "M.D." are valid exercises of state police power, and as
such, subject to the "rational basisM test. Cases dealing with advertising bv licensed
professionals are inapposite.
Hodsen relies on Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business and Professional
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Regulation. 512 U.S. 136, 114 S.Ct. 2084 (1994) to argue that intermediate First
Amendment scrutiny, as used in commercial speech cases, should apply to the UMPA's
limitation on his use of the professional designation "M.D." However, Ibanez, an
attorney advertising case, is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. Ibanez, a
licensed Florida attorney, was also licensed by the state as a Certified Public Accountant
("CPA") and she was authorized by the Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards to
use the Certified Financial Planner designation ("CFP"). When she used the designation
"CPA" and "CFR" in her advertisement and letterhead, she was sanctioned by the Florida
Board of Accountancy for engaging in false, deceptive, or misleading advertising
because, the Board reasoned, she held herself out as being subject to the Board's
jurisdiction when she acted and believed that she was not. The Supreme Court said that
Ibanez9 mistaken belief about the Board's jurisdiction was not sufficient grounds to
sanction her actions in advertising, holding that advertising by a licensed professional is
commercial speech, subject to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny.
The distinction between Ibanez (and other professional advertising cases) and the
case at bar is clear. Ibanez involved truthful, non-misleading advertising by a licensed
professional, who included her "CPA" and "CFR" designations, which she was fully
authorized by the state to use, in her advertising. Therefore, the statutes requiring
licensure to practice law and accountancy were satisfied. The sanction against Ibanez'
advertising went beyond the scope of simply requiring licensure before the use of
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professional designations, thus resulting in the application of intermediate First
Amendment scrutiny.
In the case at bar, Hodsen, who is not licensed to practice medicine, seeks to hold
himself out to the public as an "M.D." and seeks to diagnose medical conditions without
being licensed to do so. The Utah Legislature has exercised its police powers in
determining that those not licensed to practice medicine may not use any of several
designations, including ,fM.D.,ff because of the potential to mislead the public into
believing that the person is licensed to practice medicine. Unlike the sanction against
Ibanez, the prohibition against Hodsen's use of professional designations is limited and
applicable only until he becomes licensed to practice medicine. Neither Ibanez nor any
other case cited by Hodsen apply First Amendment analysis to the State's limitation of
the use of professional designations by unlicensed individuals in fields requiring
licensure.
The Supreme Court's admonition in Ibanez. cited by Hodsen in his brief at p. 38,
that "mere speculation or conjecture will not suffice; rather the State 'must demonstrate
that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a
material degree,M relates to limitations placed by the State on advertising by licensed
professionals because of their use of professional designations they are otherwise
authorized to use. Neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor the Utah Supreme Court has ever
applied First Amendment scrutiny, at any level, to the supposed First Amendment rights
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of a non-licensed individual to engage in the practice of medicine, including the use of
professional designations. Likewise, neither court has required a state to demonstrate that
each unlicensed individual practicing medicine poses a distinct threat to the public before
the state may enjoin his unlicensed practice of the profession.

POINT III: THE UTAH MEDICAL PRACTICES ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE
HODSEN'S OR ANDERSON'S RIGHT TO FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION.

The Utah Medical Practices Act does not violate Hodsen or Anderson's right to
free exercise of religion. The Act specifically exempts from its purview the good faith
practice of religious tenets.14 Thus, only if diagnosing medical conditions was a true tenet
of Hodsen's religion could he claim a conflict. He has stipulated that it is not.
Justice Cardozo, then a Judge on the New York Court of Appeals, considered a
free exercise of religion attack on the New York medical practices act in People v.
Vogelgesang, 116 N.E. 977 (N.Y.App. 1917). Vogelgesang, a self-described Spiritualist
who claimed he was practicing the religious tenets of his church when he combined
prayer with medicinal treatment of the physical ailments of his paying patients,
challenged his conviction of practicing medicine without a license. The New York Act,
like the Utah Act, exempted from its licensure requirement the practice of religious
tenets. Justice Cardozo, quoting Voltaire, said, "'It is beyond all question or dispute that
14

Utah Code Ann. § 58-67-305(4) (1998).
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magic words and ceremonies are quite capable of most effectually destroying a whole
flock of sheep, if the words be accompanied by a sufficient quantity of arsenic.'"
Vogelgesang at 978. The court reasoned that, in order to be protected, the practice of
religion itself must be the cure. The operation of the power of the spirit must be direct
and immediate, not indirect or remote. In rejecting Vogelgesang's free expression
argument, Justice Cardozo held that "The law exacts no license for ministration by prayer
or by the power of religion. But one who heals by other agencies must have the training
of the expert." Vogelgesang at 978. Accord State v. Verbon. 167 Wash. 140, 8 P.2d
1083 (Wash. 1932), in which the Washington Supreme Court held that the Washington
statute requiring licensure to practice medicine but exempting the practice of religious
tenets from the requirement does not violate their appellant's free exercise of religion.
Likewise, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of a state
statute which required licensure of drugless practitioners even where their practice
consisted of both prayer and the application of drugless medical principles, even though
the statute exempted from the licensure healing through prayer and faith alone. In Crane
v. Johnson, 242 U.S. 339 (1917), the Court held that such a statute does not violate equal
protection principles because there is a distinction between those who exercise faith and
prayer alone in healing the sick and infirm, and those who combine prayer and faith with
the practice of drugless principles which require special skill, experience, and ability.
Thus, the free exercise clause does not remove healing by means of special skill,
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experience, and ability from the appropriate sphere of professional regulation simply
because it is accompanied by prayer and faith.
Furthermore, Anderson's claims do not give greater rights to Hodsen. DOPL does
not regulate Anderson nor her actions. The only issue here is whether Hodsen can engage
in the conduct of diagnosing or call himself an "M.D.f,without being licensed. To assert
that Anderson's beliefs give greater rights to Hodsen and imbue him with the right to
practice medicine without a license would change the issue into one concerning the depth
of the beliefs of each of Hodsen's other customers, many of whom are not involved in
any religious pursuit in receiving his diagnostic services or purchasing his herbs. A
similar argument in other licensing fields would read as follows - Joe believes that Bob,
who drives an automobile but has never been licensed to do so, is inspired, that in the past
Bob's driving saved Joe's life, that Joe believes that the driving was based on divine
inspiration, and therefore Joe has a right pursuant to his free exercise of religion to have
Bob drive him wherever he wants to go. Thus, the argument would go, the state's
prohibition against Bob driving without a license violates Joe's right to free expression of
his religion.
Similar logic has already been tried in arguing that the right to refuse treatment
means that an individual has a right to receive a particular treatment, which the courts
have uniformly rejected. In Peckman v. Thompson, 745 F.Supp. 1388, 1390 (CD. 111.
1990), the court held that the regulation of the practice of medicine does not violate the
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rights of those who wish to avail themselves of the services of an excluded or regulated
profession. Although a person may enjoy a right to seek or reject medical treatment
generally, there is no constitutional right to select a particular treatment or procedure over
the rational objections of a governmental license authority.
Similarly, in Rutherford v. United States, 616 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1980), the
court rejected the argument that a right to seek or refuse treatment translates to a right to
have a specific treatment even when disallowed by the government. The court held that
the decision by a patient whether to have a treatment or not is a protected right, but his
selection of a particular treatment or at least a medication is within the governmental
interest in protecting the public health.
Although Anderson has a right to believe whoever she wishes is inspired, it does
not follow that her good faith belief in the inspired nature of Hodsen gives him the right
to diagnose her medical conditions without being licensed by the state or otherwise
complying with the law. If this were the case, any person could shield himself from
licensure requirements by claiming he was inspired by God and by finding customers to
agree with him.

CONCLUSION
Hodsen has failed to meet his burden on appeal. The trial court correctly found
that the Utah Medical Procedures Act does not violate Hodsen's or Anderson's right to
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freedom of speech or to free exercise of religion. Hodsen is not entitled to the relief he
has requested. The State of Utah, Department of Commerce, Division of Occupational
and Professional Licensing respectfully asks the Court to affirm the order of the Fifth
Judicial District Court.
Respectfully submitted this j

day of

<aju>n..e

, 1999.

JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL

ASSIST.
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ADDENDUM I

Matthew Hilton (#A3655)
MATTHEW HILTON, P.C.
Participating Attorney for the Rutherford Institute
Attorney for Plaintiffs
P.O. Box 781
Springville, UT 84663
Telephone: (801)489-1111
Facsimile: (801)489-6000
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo—
HORTON HODSEN, as agent for Nutriphysio-)
logy, (previously known as Nutribionics and
Biochem Research Services), and for himself )
personally, as Horton E. Tatarian, and GAIL
ANDERSON,
)
Plaintiffs.

AGREED STATEMENT
OF UNDISPUTED FACTS

)

vs.

)
Civil No. 960500182

CITY OF ST. GEORGE, a municipality under )
Utah Law, and CRAIG JACKSON, Director
of the Division of Occupational and
)
Professional Licensing, Department of
Commerce, State of Utah, in his official
)
capacity,
Defendants.

Judge James L. Shumate

)
—oooOooo—

COMES NOW the parties above-named, by and through their attorneys of
record, Thorn D. Roberts, Assistant Attorney General, on behalf of Defendant Craig
Jackson, Director of the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, and
Matthew Hilton, on behalf of Plaintiffs, and solely for the purpose of resolving the
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motions for summary judgment filed by the parties, hereby stipulate and agree that the
following may be considered as undisputed facts for purposes of those motions:
1. Hodsen is a graduate of the University of California Los Angeles School of
Medicine and has a degree in biochemistry from University of California Berkeley. He did
not complete his medical internship after medical school due to a debilitating illness which
resulted in his discharge from the United States Army with a one hundred percent (100%)
medical disability. Since that time he has not taken the necessary examinations to receive
a license as a physician or surgeon from DOPL. As a matter of conscience and deeply
held scientific belief, Hodsen does not desire to practice medicine as it is generally
practiced today nor obtain a license to do so.
2. Since the early 1980's, many people in and out of the State of Utah have sought
information from Hodsen that was available in published medical journals, books, and
other sources, including Hodsen's own research, regarding various biochemicals and what
naturally occurring products are lawfully sold on the open market as herbal or nutritional
supplements that contain these biochemicals.
3. Hodsen distributes herbal and other nutritional (non-prescription) products to
chiropractors, physicians, and other health professionals as well as to health food stores
and to individuals.
4. In 1983, DOPL staff determined that Hodsen's practice and business was
exempted from regulation of the practice of medicine and issued him a letter to that effect.
5. From 1983 to the present, DOPL has not received a complaint regarding the
conduct or actions of Hodsen.
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6.

Anderson consulted with Hodsen during the time period that DOPL had

determined he was exempted from the licensure requirements for the practice of medicine
for a health condition which had not responded to conventional medical treatment that had
been applied.

She followed the recommendation of Hodsen and she believes her

condition has become manageable and the quality of her life vastly improved. Anderson
also currently is under the care of a licensed physician and also receives acupuncture
treatments from another licensed provider.
7. Hodsen believes that through the gift of the Holy Ghost, special priesthood (or
church related) blessings he has received, and other spiritual experiences, that he has a
divine mission to assist his fellow man in obtaining and properly using herbal and other
products of nature. Hodsen believes that while the process of receipt of information from
people, his review thereof, and his determinations and recommendations does not in and
of itself constitute religious practices or belief, it provides assistance to him in fulfilling to
the best of his ability his believed duty to learn, teach, and serve by study and faith.
(Doctrine and Covenants 88:74-80.) Hodsen's approach to advising customers about the
use of herbs or nutritional products is based on the use of regular prayer to guide his
interpretation of scientific data and information provided by the customer for the purpose
of making recommendations. He believes that he can and does receive divine assistance
regarding these matters. Hodsen believes his knowledge obtained through formal training
in biochemistry and medicine also enable him to interpret the meaning of the information
provided to him.
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8. In 1991, Hodsen submitted an application for business license to the City of St.
George seeking permission to proceed with his on-going business of consulting and
supplying of herbs and other products of nature that Hodsen referred to as nutritional
biochemicals.
9. Throughout 1991 and early 1992, the City worked with Hodsen regarding a
number of applications for city licensure, but determined, after consultation with DOPL
staff, that Mr. Hodsen's practice constituted the practice of medicine and indicated that
Hodsen must have the matter clarified or be licensed by DOPL before the City would issue
a business license.
10. In response to the written requirements of the City, in 1992, Hodsen petitioned
DOPL for a ruling regarding his ability to conduct his business and talk with customers
concerning his business without being licensed as a physician or surgeon in the State of
Utah.
11. The administrative proceedings conducted by DOPL in response to Hodsen's
request resulted in the issuance of a Declaratory Order (October 20, 1992), an Order on
Review (December 11,1992), an Amendment to Declaratory Order (December 15, 1992),
and Amended Order on Review and Denial of Request for Agency Review (January 26,
1993). The result of the administrative proceedings was that DOPL concluded that
Hodsen was required to either be licensed as a physician or surgeon or certified as a
dietician. An appeal was timely filed in Fifth Judicial District Court.
12. Eventually, Anderson joined with Hodsen in litigation as a party plaintiff against
DOPL in the Fifth Judicial District Court case number 930500251. Before summary
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judgment motions were heard in that case, DOPL stipulated to Anderson's claimed need
for information, advice, and recommendations from Hodsen regarding herbal treatments
and other forms of natural healing, and that these recommendations were related to her
religious beliefs and practices as well as the determination of her own and her family's
health care. DOPL also stipulated that these actions were consistent with Hodsen's
personal, religious, and commercial beliefs.
13. After joint summary judgment motions and briefing on various legal issues, as
well as oral argument, District Court Judge J. Philip Eves issued a ruling in March of 1995,
finding that under the relevant statutory requirements Hodsen's conduct was exempt from
the requirements of licensure of DOPL. Judge Eves stated:
The activities of the Plaintiff do in fact come within the definition of the
practice of medicine. The stipulated facts clearly indicates that the plaintiff
engages in diagnosing and treating or advising for human disease, ailment,
injury, infirmity, or deformity or pain or any other condition by any means or
instrumentality. Clearly that broad definition includes the activities in which
Mr. Hodsen engaged, including obtaining a medical history, analyzing the
complaints of his patrons, and attempting to fashion a medicinal remedy to
improve the complained of condition.
The parties also stipulated that the "substances in question [were] in fact herbs and other
products of nature within in the meaning of the statute," and the Court determined
Hodsen's actions were thus within the statutory exemption for those "engaged in
administering or selling health foods or health food supplements, herbs, or other products
of nature which do not require a prescription under law" pursuant to § 58-12-30(4) U.C.A.,
the law in effect at that time. That ruling was not appealed by either party.
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14.

During the 1996 Legislative session, the Utah Medical Practice Act was

amended and recodified, including a change in the definition of the practice of medicine
and altered the exemption involving the sale of herbs and other products of nature.
15. The previous and present language of the term "diagnose" in the practice of
medicine included the following:
a. Pre-1996 language contained in § 58-12-28(2) U.C.A.:
(2) "Diagnose" means to examine in any manner another
person, parts of a person's body, substances, fluids, or
materials excreted, taken, or removed from a person's body,
or produced by a person's body, to determine the source,
nature, kind or extent of disease or other physical or mental
condition, or to attempt to so examine or to determine, or to
hold oneself out or represent that an examination or
determination is being made or to make an examination or
determination upon or from information supplied directly or
indirectly by another person, whether or not in the presence of
the person making or attempting to make the diagnosis.
b. 1996 language contained in § 58-67-102(4) U.C.A.:
(4) "Diagnose" means:
(a) to examine in any manner another person, parts of a
person's body, substances, fluids, or materials excreted,
taken, or removed from a person's body, or produced by a
person's body, to determine the source, nature, kind or extent
of disease or other physical or mental condition;
(b) to attempt to conduct an examination or determination
described under Subsection 4(a);
(c.) to hold oneself out as making or to represent that one is
making an examination or determination as described in
Subsection 4(a); or
(d) to make an examination or determination as described in
Subsection 4(a) upon or from information supplied directly or
6

indirectly by another person, whether or not in the presence of
the person making or attempting to make the diagnosis or
examination.
The previous and present language dealing with the definition of the practice
of medicine are as follows:
a. Pre-1996 language contained in § 58-67-102(4) U.C.A.:
medicine" means:
(a) .w diagnose, treat, correct, advise, or
prescribe for any human disease, ailment, injury,
infirmity, deformity, pain or other condition,
physical or mental, real or imaginary, or to
attempt to do so, by any means or
instrumentality; . . . .
d6 language contained in § 58-67-102(8) U.C.A.:
(8) "Practice of medicii le" i i leai i s :

] :,v

: --"

(a) to diagnose, treat, correct, or prescribe for
any human disease, ailment, injury, infirmity,
deformity, pain or other condition, physical or
mental, real or imaginary, or to attempt to do so,
by any means or instrumentality, and by an
individual in Utah or outside of the state upon or
for any human within the state;
17. The previous and present language dealing
follows:
a. Pre-1996 language container
(4) "Practice of medicine" mean:
(c.) to use, in the conduct of any occupation or
profession pertaining to the diagnosis or
treatment of human diseases or conditions in
any printed material, stationary, letterhead,
7

s

envelopes,
signs,
advertisements,
the
designation "doctor," "doctor of medicine,"
"physician," "surgeon," "Dr.," "M.D.," or any
combination of these designations, unless the
designation additionally contains the description
of the branch of the healing arts for which the
person has a license.
b. 1996 language contained in § 58-67-102(8)(d) U.C.A.:
(8) "Practice of medicine" means:
(d) to use, in the conduct of any occupation or
profession pertaining to the diagnosis or
treatment of human diseases or conditions in
any printed material, stationary, letterhead,
envelopes, signs, or advertisements, the
designation "doctor," "doctor of medicine,"
"physician," "surgeon," "Dr.," "M.D.," or any
combination of these designations in any
manner which might cause a reasonable person
to believe the individual using the designation is
a licensed physician or surgeon, and if the party
using the designation is not a licensed physician
or surgeon, the designation must additionally
contain the description of the branch of healing
arts for which the person has a license.
18. The previous and present language dealing with exemption for those involved
with domestic and household remedies, herbs, and other products of nature are as follows:
a. Pre-1996 language contained in § 58-12-30(4) U.C.A.:
In addition to exemptions from licensure in Section 58-1-307,
the following individuals may engage in the practice of
medicine subject to the stated circumstances and limitations
without being licensed under this chapter:....
(4) any individual administering a domestic or family remedy
including those persons engaged in the sale of vitamins,
health food or health food supplements, herbs or other
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products of nature, except drugs or medicines for which an
authorized prescription is required by law
, 1996 language contained in §§ 58-67-305(2) & (3) U.C.A.:
In addition to exemptions from licensure in Section 58-1-307, the following
individuals may engage in the described acts or practices without being
licensed under this chapter:....
(2) an individual administering a domestic or family remedy;
(3) (a)( i) a person engaged in the sale of vitamins, health
foods, dietary supplements, herbs or other products of nature,
the sale of which is not otherwise prohibited by state or federal
law; or
(u) a person acting in good faith for religious
reasons, as a matter of conscience, or based on
a personal belief, when obtaining or providing
any information regarding health care and the
use of any product under Subsection 3(a)(1); and
(b) Subsection 3(a) does not:
( i) allow a person to diagnose any human
disease, ailment, injury, infirmity, deformity, pain,
or other condition; or
(ii) prohibit providing truthful and non-misleading
information regarding any of the products under
Subsection 3(a)(1)*
19. Hodsen seeks to place the following language on his commercial or personal
literature or other expression without offending the provisions of the statute regarding the
use of the term "Dr." or "M.D." Hodsen desires to use a business i , Il m, I I i «.| iih
following:
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III i

NUTRIPHYSIOLOGY
Free Expert Service for Obtaining Effective Nutritional Supplements
From Carefully Selected Firms
Horton Tatarian, M.D.*
Horton: (1-888-852-8887)
(435-673-8887)
Orders: (1-888-852-8885)
(435-673-8885)
Fax: (1-888-852-8289)
(435-673-8886)
Box 1990, St. George, UT 84771
*Graduate of U.C.L.A. School of Medicine
Research biochemist not in medical practice
In addition, Hodsen desires to know if when writing educational publications he may list
his name as follows: Horton Tatarian, M.D. (Graduate of U.C.L.A. School of Medicine,
Research biochemist not in medical practice)
20. Having reviewed Hodsen's request, it is the position of DOPL that such a use
of the initials "M.D." might cause a reasonable person to believe that Hodsen is a licensed
physician or surgeon and that such use, in connection with Hodsen's businesses, may be
deceptive or misleading regarding Hodsen's status or qualifications as it applies to DOPL's
regulatory function.
21. Because of the 1996 changes in the Utah Medical Practice Act, Hodsen is
unsure as to what information he may share with Anderson or any other person. Hodsen
is and remains concerned that without assistance from this Court clarifying the application
of the 1996 Utah Medical Practice Act to him, he will be subject to felony prosecution,
misdemeanor prosecution for violation of city licensing laws, and/or injunctive proceedings

10

fi

i Defendants for practicing medicine without a license.

In addition, Hodsen

believes on religious grounds that he is required to obey the law of the land. (Twelfth
Article of Faith) and appeal to civil law for redress of wrongs. (Doctrine and Covenants

134
ruling of this court regarding the application of UMPA to his situation.
2

l 0 d s e n a n d a | S 0 s o m e 0 f h j s cus tomers

believe that mankind is under divine

command to use wholesome herbs for the maintenance of their health, with "prudence and
thanksgiving." (Doctrine and Covenants 89:10-11) To further this divine commandment
(commc
explain their religiously based beliefs regarding the divine nature of the human body, its
relai

Universe, and the role of biochemistry, herbs and nutrition in the

appropriate maintenance of the same. They believe that obtaining and sharing information
regarding the prudent use of herbs or other matters can aid in a natural healing process.
They do
so doing, they feel they will be entitled to physical and spiritual blessings. (See Doctrine
tjn ,

ail icll""

" Is m I! 11 ,'" III, II I I ile, 1 laniell 1\ Book of Mormon, Alma 46:40.)

?3

Hodsen's interactions with Anderson and any other potential customers of

herbs and other products of nature (in both a selling and non-selling situation) can be
summarized as follows:
A. Anderson (or any other person as a customer) approaches Hodsen and shares
with him

11

(1) gives him a written diagnosis by a licensed health care provider
indicating she has a certain health condition, or
(2) explains that on her own she used home medical testing equipment or
studied medical literature and has concluded she has a certain health
condition, or
(3) states she had an intuitive or spiritual impression, or is told in a religious
blessing or otherwise, that she has a certain health condition; or
(4) indicates orally or in writing that she had experienced symptoms of a
health condition (written examples are attached );
B. Using any or all of the information provided by Anderson or any other potential
customer, Hodsen identifies what he believes the nutritional needs of the person most
likely are, and pursuant to the process identified in paragraph 7 of these stipulated facts,
determines what lawful herbal or other products of nature would likely contribute to
satisfying those needs; and
C. With or without disclosing his rationale for his recommendation, Hodsen advises
Anderson or any other potential customer that she should purchase the identified lawful
herbs or other products of nature, which the person is free to purchase from Hodsen, or
any other person, or source, and may refer her to or supply her with peer reviewed
academic or religious materials regarding the ingredients of the herbs or other products
of nature.

12

24. As found by Judge Eves, and presently interpreted by DOPL, the conduct of
Hodsei "i

>

jiagnosis as defined by the

provisions of U.C.A. § 58-67-102(4)(d), and is the practice of medicine.
nere are numerous scientific publications and other studies that indicate the
^ use of herbs or products of nature, religiously based belief or prayei , ai id otl ler aspects
of holistic healing may have a positive impact upon the maintenance of one's health.
26.

Nothim mi nil i li iii"

iiiinii in ill

in iii ni ii; i i mi iM mini ii,jiij I ill mi HI III in I ill in,,1 ni lefendants from

asserting any defense, including the legal relevancy of any u n d i s p u t e d fact or the court's
«i ill"

1 1 1,1,1115 I i i II •• in IL-I its of t h e c l a i m s o f t h e P l a i n t i f f s .

27,

II is anticipated by the parties that Plaintiff Anderson win

• •

affidavit

regarding her sentiments and conduct regarding her religious, medical and personal
autonomy beliefs.
DATED this 28th day of April, 1998.
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